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PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVES
PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE GUN POLICY
Philip J. Cook*
Jens Ludwig**
INTRODUCTION
It is easy to believe that any moderate program to reduce gun
violence is doomed by the simple fact that there are over 200 million
guns in circulation.' Yet research suggests a more upbeat conclusion.
It is not necessary to do away with legitimate private ownership of
guns to reduce gun misuse by youths and criminals. Moderate
measures can lead to worthwhile results. Some feasible approaches
have demonstrated success, and others appear promising even though
not yet fully evaluated. A good place to start in seeking effective gun
policy is with the evidence.
Of course, in an area so contentious, it is difficult to sort out the
credible research findings. The debate is typically engaged with
anecdotes and slogans.2 Rather than ignore this reality, we use three
familiar pro-gun bumper-sticker slogans to organize a discussion of
several of the basic empirical issues. Finding that the evidence points
in quite a different direction, we offer our own conclusions. First, a
promising strategy for reducing gun violence is to make guns a legal
liability to criminals, a goal that can be furthered through a variety of
both regulatory and law enforcement tactics. Second, while existing
'supply side" regulations on gun transfers (what most people mean by
* ITT/Terry Sanford Distinguished Professor of Public Policy Studies, Duke
University.
** Associate Professor of Public Policy, Georgetown University. The accuracy of the
data used in this Article is based on the authors' own examination of the data.
1. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: Results of a Comprehensive
National Survey on Firearms Ownership and Use 1 (1996).
2. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291, 1299-1302 (2003)
(asserting that individual positions on gun policy reflect cultural worldview, with facts
and substantive arguments having little or no actual influence); see also Philip J. Cook
& Jens Ludwig, Pragmatic Gun Policy, in Evaluating Gun Policy 1, 31-33 (Jens
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (suggesting that worldview is surely important,
but that dispassionate analysis of the evidence is attainable and essential to reducing
gun violence).
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"gun control") do not appear to have had much effect,3 several
innovative approaches to shrinking the illicit market are worth serious
consideration. Translating these conclusions into catchy new slogans
is an exercise we leave to the reader.
I. GUNS DON'T KILL PEOPLE -PEOPLE KILL PEOPLE
This familiar slogan suggests that it is not the weapon type that
matters, but rather the intention of the assailant. The reality,
however, is that violent confrontations usually do not have a
predetermined outcome, and there is an important "instrumentality"
effect.4
Relative to other types of readily available weapons, guns are
intrinsically more lethal, providing the assailant with the power to kill
quickly, at a distance, and with little effort or sustained intent.' The
evidence shows that if a gun is deployed during a violent encounter,
the chance that someone will die or be seriously injured is increased.6
The slogan should be revised to say: "Guns don't kill people; they just
make it real easy." That accounts in part for the fact that while only a
small fraction of assaults involve guns, two-thirds of homicides do.' In
short, guns intensify violence.
The widespread availability of guns helps account for the most
prominent and distinctive feature of crime in the United States.
While it is often said that the United States is an exceptionally violent
country, with some explanations referencing the frontier tradition or
southern culture,8 a closer look at the data indicates that we do not
have an exceptionally high volume of violence-our rates of assault
and robbery are comparable to those in some other developed
3. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
4. See David Hemenway, Private Guns, Public Health 45-47 (2004); Gary Kleck,
Targeting Guns: Firearms and Their Control 167-74 (1997); Philip J. Cook, The
Technology of Personal Violence, in 14 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 1, 1
(Michael Tonry ed., 1991); Garen Wintemute, Guns and Gun Violence, in The Crime
Drop in America 45, 45-47 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000).
5. See Hemenway, supra note 4, at 45-46.
6. See Franklin Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 721, 735-37 (1968); Franklin E. Zimring, The Medium is the Message:
Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death from Assault, 1 J. of Legal Stud. 97, 113
(1972); see, e.g., Philip J. Cook, Robbery Violence, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 357,
371-72 (1987) (reporting that robberies with guns are three times as likely to result in
the death of the victim than robberies with knives). Cook's analysis of variations in
robbery murder rates in large cities indicates that changes in those rates over time are
closely linked to changes in the underlying robbery rate, and that an increase in gun
robbery is associated with a larger proportional increase in murder than is a similar
increase in non-gun robbery.
7. FBI, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crime in the United States 2002: Uniform Crime
Reports 23, 38 (2003).
8. Fox Butterfield, All God's Children: The Bosket Family and the American
Tradition of Violence 8-9 (1995).
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countries.9 But the rate of gun use in these crimes is much higher. 0
The result, as pointed out by Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins
in Crime Is Not the Problem, is a homicide rate several times that
found in other developed countries."
It is fair to say that Michael Moore's film Bowling for Columbine"
has educated far more people about guns than the social science
literature, and we are often asked about Moore's assertions about the
lessons of the Canadian experience. The movie's message is that
Canada is like the United States in having lots of guns, yet it has a far
lower homicide rate, suggesting that guns per se are not the problem. 3
As it turns out, however, gun ownership in Canada is only about half
as common as in the United States, and handgun ownership still
rarer. 4 More importantly, other aspects of Canadian society lead that
country to have a lower rate of violent crime than the United States.
It is the combination of widespread gun ownership with a high rate of
violence in the United States that produces such deadly results.
Canada has less of both dimensions.
9. Hemenway, supra note 4, at 2.
10. Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime Is Not the Problem: Lethal
Violence in America 50 (1997).
11. Id. at 8; see also Hemenway, supra note 4, at 46.
12. Bowling for Columbine (United Artists/Alliance Atlantis 2002). In the movie,
Moore investigates the roots of the high rate of homicide by firearm in the United
States.
13. In 2000, the Canadian homicide rate was 1.8 per 100,000 people, compared
with 5.5 per 100,000 people in the United States during that year. See Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Crime & Justice Data Online, at
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj .gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/State/statebystaterun.cfm?statei
d=52 (last revised Apr. 14, 2003) (providing the U.S. data); Statistics Can., The Daily,
Crime Statistics (July 19, 2001) (providing the Canada data), at
http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/010719/d010719b.htm.
14. Richard Block, Dep't of Justice, Can., Firearms in Canada and Eight Other
Western Countries: Selected Findings of the 1996 International Crime (Victim)
Survey 3-6 (1998), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/wd97-3a-e.pdf.
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF CRIME RATES BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA FOR 200015
United States Canada
Aggravated Assault/100,000 323.6 8
Robbery/100,000 144.9 87.8
Criminal Homicide/100,000 5.5 1.8
Gun Homicide/100,000 3.616 0.6
Handgun Prevalence 19.6 2.317
(% of households)
Overall gun Prevalence 32.5 17
(% of households)
While the conclusion that the type of weapon matters would seem
to be common sense, it is often ignored. Conventional legal and
criminological interpretations of homicide place more emphasis on
motivation, intent, and character than on the type of weapon used by
an assailant." But the evidence suggests that regardless of intent and
character, a successful effort to separate guns from violence would
sharply reduce the number of victims killed in domestic violence,19
robberies,20 and routine altercations. 1
15. United States data is taken from a number of sources. James A. Davis et al.,
General Social Surveys, 1972-2002, Study No. 3728, at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
(last visited Sept. 23, 2004) (unpublished data on file with authors, authors'
calculation of gun prevalence from unpublished data); FBI, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Crime in the United States 2000: Uniform Crime Reports 15, 30, 35 (2001) (providing
crime rates). Canada data is similarly taken from a number of sources. Block, supra
note 14, at 6 (providing handgun prevalence data); Can. Centre for Justice Statistics,
Canadian Crime Statistics 2000, at 16 (2001) (providing aggravated assault rate),
available at http://www.sunsite.ualberta.ca/Canada/ustice/statistics/2000-crime-e.pdf;
Coalition for Gun Control, Firearms Misuse, at
http://www.guncontrol.ca/Content/FirearmsMisuse.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2004)
(providing gun homicide rate); GPC Research, Fall 2000 Estimate of Firearms
Ownership, available at http://www.cfc-
ccaf.gc.ca/en/general-public/news-releases/GPC/survey.pdf (last visited Sept. 23,
2004) (providing overall prevalence data); Statistics Can., supra note 13.
16. This statistic is derived from the fact that approximately sixty-five percent of
murder weapons in 2000 were firearms. See FBI, supra note 15, at 18. Sixty-five
percent of 5.5-the total number of criminal homicides per 100,000 people -yields 3.6
gun homicides per 100,000 people.
17. Note that unlike the other data in this table, this statistic is for 1996, not 2000.
See generally Block, supra note 14.
18. See generally Marvin E. Wolfgang, Patterns in Criminal Homicide (1958);
Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have Opposed, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 188 (1995). In the 1970s and subsequently, a number of states adopted
sentence-enhancement provisions for use of a firearm in crime. Jon S. Vernick & Lisa
M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for 1970-99, in Evaluating Gun
Policy, supra note 2, at 345, 392-98.
19. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 Am. J. Pub. Health
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A. Social Costs
Knowing that guns intensify violence does not in itself support a
conclusion that gun violence is a serious problem for our society. A
majority of homicide victims are themselves involved in criminal
activity or at least have criminal records, and for that reason some
commentators discount the value of the lives lost.22 But this
perspective is not only mean-spirited, it is also myopic in conceiving of
the "cost" as borne only by those who are wounded or killed.
In fact, gun violence creates a considerable economic and social
burden, widely shared, that goes well beyond the disability and death
inflicted on immediate victims. As one tangible indication, residents
seek to move out of neighborhoods afflicted with lethal violence;23 by
one estimate, seventy people leave on average for every killing.24
Even for those who can afford to live in low-crime neighborhoods, the
threat of gun violence may have some distorting effect on day-to-day
decisions regarding work and play, and creates concern about the risks
that remain to friends and family.25 Indeed, gunfire has a unique
ability to terrorize a community; there are no "drive-by knifings" and
few people are wounded by stray razorblades. A program that could
reduce the threat of gun violence would be worth something to most
households. In particular, a national survey found that the average
household would be willing to pay $239 per year in increased taxes for
a thirty percent reduction in gun use in assault.26
The impact of gun violence on the community is generally
illustrated by the effects of the extraordinary reduction in homicide
rates during the 1990s. According to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"), criminal homicide dropped nationwide from
9.8 per 100,000 in 1991 to a low of 5.5 in 2000 (with a slight increase
since then). Many large cities enjoyed an equal or larger
1089, 1089 (2003); Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Disarming
Batterers: The Impact of Domestic Violence Firearm Laws, in Evaluating Gun Policy,
supra note 2, at 157, 197-201.
20. Cook, supra note 6, at 373-76.
21. See Hemenway, supra note 4, at 54 ("'You're just as likely to get punched in
the mouth in a bar in Sydney [Australia] as in a bar in Los Angeles. But you're 20
times as likely to be killed in Los Angeles."') (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
22. Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Gun Violence: The Real Costs 23, 188-91
(2000).
23. Id. at 92-93; Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and
the Consequences for Cities, 81 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 159, 159 (1999).
24. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 22, at 104.
25. See generally Cook & Ludwig, supra note 22; Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig,
The Costs of Gun Violence Against Children, 12 Future Child. 87 (2002).
26. Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, The Benefits of Reducing Gun Violence:
Evidence from Contingent- Valuation Survey Data, 22 J. Risk & Uncertainty 207, 218
(2001).
27. Bureau of Justice Statistics Crime & Justice Data Online, supra note 13.
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proportional reduction in serious violence.2" This remarkable change
has contributed to the renaissance of a number of inner city
communities. A recent analysis estimates that the fall in violent crime
in New York City accounts for about one-third of the post-1994 boom
in property values.29
B. Who Can Be Trusted?
Guns intensify violence, and it is guns in the hands of violent or
reckless people that are of particular concern. While guns are
intrinsically dangerous and could end up being misused in most any
household,3" the fact is that the risk of gun misuse is quite
concentrated. In particular, it appears that a majority of killers have
arrest records.3 Gun possession by violence-prone and criminally-
involved individuals poses much higher costs for society than gun
possession by more responsible people.32 That suggests another edit
on the slogan: "Guns don't kill people; violent and impulsive people
kill people-usually with guns."
In designing gun policy, it is important to determine whether
"violence-prone" people can be identified from available records.
28. See Bureau of Justice Statistics Crime & Justice Data Online, at
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj .gov/dataonline/Search/Crime/LocaliTrendslnOneVarLarge.cf
m (last revised Jan. 16, 2003) (providing searchable data that demonstrates that cities
including New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago enjoyed significant drops in violent
crime between 1991 and 2000).
29. Amy Ellen Schwartz et al., Has Falling Crime Driven New York City's Real
Estate Boom?, 14 J. Housing Res. 101, 131-32 (2003).
30. Recent research using case control methods demonstrates that gun possession
is a strong positive correlate of the likelihood that a batterer will eventually kill his
intimate partner. See Campbell et al., supra note 19, at 1094. More generally, a gun in
the home has been shown to be a risk factor for homicide victimization, but only for
gun homicide, after controlling for several other household characteristics. See
generally Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide
in the Home, 329 New Eng. J. Med. 1084 (1993); Douglas J. Wiebe, Homicide and
Suicide Risks Associated with Firearms in the Home: A National Case-Control Study,
41 Annals Emergency Med. 771 (2003). Other studies have documented that guns
kept in the home are widely misused against other members of the household. See,
e.g., Deborah Azrael & David Hemenway, 'In the Safety of Your Own Home'. Results
from a National Survey of Gun Use at Home, 50 Soc. Sci. & Med. 285, 290 (2000). A
case control study in Washington state found that handgun purchase by a member of
the family was associated with a substantial increase in homicide risk-with typically
very long lags between purchase and killing. Peter Cummings et al., The Association
Between the Purchase of a Handgun and Homicide or Suicide, 87 Am. J. Pub. Health
974, 974, 976 (1997). Whether these studies have identified a direct causal
relationship is not clear, but the logic of availability for misuse is compelling.
31. See generally Don B. Kates & Daniel D. Polsby, The Myth of the "Virgin
Killer": Law-Abiding Persons Who Kill in Fit of Rage (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors).
32. On the other hand, there appears to be a close connection between the
general prevalence of gun ownership and the availability of guns to criminals. Philip J.
Cook & Jens Ludwig, Does Gun Prevalence Affect Teen Gun Carrying After All?, 42
Criminology 27, 27-28 (2004).
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Federal law prohibits anyone with a felony conviction or under
indictment from possessing a gun; those convicted of domestic
violence or under a restraining order are also prohibited. 33 Licensed
dealers must initiate a criminal history check on buyers before
transferring a weapon.3 n Criminal history records have improved in
recent years (with some help from federal programs), and around
200,000 would-be buyers are blocked from purchasing guns every year
by routine administrative records checks.35
Age as well as crime involvement is relevant to judging
dangerousness. Common sense would suggest that a gun in the hands
of an unsupervised child poses an unacceptable risk.36 On this matter
there appears to be popular consensus, incorporated in federal and
state laws.37
II. AN ARMED SOCIETY IS A POLITE SOCIETY
Does widespread gun ownership deter crime? The argument that
private gun ownership is of positive benefit to the community rests on
a claim that it does deter crime-as asserted, for example, by
economist John R. Lott, Jr. in his book More Guns, Less Crime.38 But
the best empirical evidence does not support this position. There is
little correlation (either across jurisdictions or over time) between the
volume of violent crime and the prevalence of gun ownership. 39 For
residential burglary, the evidence indicates that rates increase with
gun prevalence, perhaps because guns have value to burglars."n A
very active topic of research in this area has been the evaluation of
concealed-carry laws. Lott and others have published findings
suggesting that states which eased restrictions on concealed carrying
have experienced a reduction in homicide and perhaps other types of
33. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 18, at 350, 352.
34. Id. at 351.
35. One author has noted:
In 1999, when checks on prospective purchasers of rifles and shotguns were
added [to the federal requirement for background checks on handgun
purchasers], some 204,000 persons-2.4% of those who applied-were
denied the purchase. Approximately 70% of denials are for felony
convictions or indictments, 10% are for domestic violence misdemeanor
convictions, 3% are for domestic violence restraining orders, and the
remainder are for other reasons.
Garen J. Wintemute, Where the Guns Come from: The Gun Industry and Gun
Commerce, 12 Future Child. 54, 67 (2002).
36. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 32, at 28.
37. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 18, at 351-52.
38. See John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun
Control Laws (1998).
39. See generally Mark Duggan, More Guns, More Crime, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 1086
(2001).
40. See generally Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns and Burglary, in Evaluating
Gun Policy, supra note 2, at 74.
2004]
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crimes." But these findings have been effectively rebutted by
subsequent research, and it now appears that easing concealed-carry
restrictions has little effect on crime rates.42
Even if widespread gun ownership in a community offers little (if
any) crime deterrent, there may still be some crime-related benefit.
Gun owners are occasionally able to interrupt a burglary or stop an
assailant from causing serious injury, but it has proven difficult to
develop a reliable estimate of just how often that happens in practice.
Surveys provide a wide range of estimates, depending on the precise
wording of questions and how they are posed to respondents.43
Estimates that there are millions of self-defense uses per year have
been reported, but are far out of line with reliable evidence about
crime rates and gunshot injuries, and hence have little credibility." A
more reasonable estimate from the National Crime Victimization
Survey, which is still subject to some challenge on methodological
grounds, is that there are about 100,000 instances per year in which
someone uses a gun to defend against an assault or break-in.45
Regardless of the objective risks and benefits of gun ownership, it
often confers a sense of security upon the members of households who
choose to own guns.46 That subjective benefit is relevant in assessing
the public interest.47
III. WHEN GUNS ARE OUTLAWED, ONLY OUTLAWS WILL HAVE
GUNS
If this familiar slogan is not a tautology, it suggests something about
the likelihood that criminals will comply with restrictions on gun
markets and gun possession. Will youths and criminals do whatever it
takes to obtain their guns? The short answer is "no." Although some
41. See John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-
Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. Legal Stud. 1, 64-65 (1997); John R. Lott, Jr.,
Editorial, Gun Control Misfires in Europe, Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at A16.
42. See generally Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More
Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1193 (2003); Dan A. Black & Daniel
S. Nagin, Do Right-to-Carry Laws Deter Violent Crime?, 27 J. Legal Stud. 209 (1998);
John J. Donohue, The Impact of Concealed-Carry Laws, in Evaluating Gun Policy,
supra note 2, at 287; Duggan, supra note 39; Jens Ludwig, Concealed-Gun-Carrying
Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.
239 (1998).
43. See Philip J. Cook et al., The Gun Debate's New Mythical Number: How
Many Defensive Gun Uses Per Year?, 16 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 463, 464 (1997).
44. See Hemenway, supra note 4, at 66-69. See generally David Hemenway, Survey
Research and Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of Extreme Overestimates, 87 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 1430 (1997); Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to
Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 150 (1995).
45. See Cook et al., supra note 43, at 468. See generally Cook, supra note 4.
46. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 1, at 43.
47. See generally Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control, in Crime: Public Policies for
Crime Control 291 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2002).
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violent people are highly motivated to obtain a gun for self-protection
or to perpetrate their crimes, that is not the rule. In fact, most violent
crime is not committed with guns. For example, only about forty
percent of hold-ups, muggings, and other robberies-crimes for which
a gun provides a real advantage to the perpetrator-are committed
with guns.48 Most robberies are committed with knives, clubs, or
force.49 Furthermore, several studies of violent youth gangs have
found that only a minority of the members have ready access to a gun
at any point in time.50 Based on interview studies with inner-city
youths and criminals, there appear to be a number of reasons why
they might be without a gun, including some who say that guns are too
expensive or hard to find.5" The point is, the relevant group-the
group that is violence prone or involved in crime-is far from
homogeneous in any dimension, including their determination to
obtain a gun and keep it handy.
48. FBI, supra note 7, at 32.
49. See Cook, supra note 6, at 363.
50. See Terence P. Thornberry et al., Gangs and Delinquency in Developmental
Perspective 128 (2003) (stating the percentage of male gang members and
nonmembers who carry or own guns); Beth Bjerregaard & Alan J. Lizotte, Gun
Ownership and Gang Membership, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 37, 43, 56 (1995)
(stating that in a study of teenage male gang members, the prevalence of gun
ownership for self-protection during three successive "waves" was 24.4%, 30.6%, and
36.7%, respectively, and the prevalence of gun ownership for sporting purposes was
0%, 11.1%, and 13.3%, respectively).
51. See Joseph F. Sheley & James D. Wright, In the Line of Fire: Youth, Guns,
and Violence in Urban America 57-74 (1995); James D. Wright & Peter H. Rossi,
Armed and Considered Dangerous: A Survey of Felons and Their Firearms 128-29,
133 (1994) (finding that the cost of a gun and the difficulty in obtaining a gun
factored--albeit as the lowest-ranking factors--into the decision of those surveyed to
carry weapons other than guns); Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 59, 64 (1995); Cook & Ludwig, supra note 32, at 31 (noting
that of prisoners who committed their crime while armed with something other than a
gun, twenty-eight percent reported that it was "'too much trouble to get [a gun]"' and
twenty-eight percent responded that a gun "'costs too much"').
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TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF SERIOUS VIOLENT CRIMES INVOLVING
GUNS IN 200252
FBI Uniform National Crime
Crime Reports Victimization
Survey
Criminal Homicide 66.7
Aggravated Assault 19.0 26.5
Robbery 42.1 25.6
Rape 
_ 4.6
Indirect evidence on this matter comes from studies of other types
of risky behavior. While parents of adolescents may find it hard to
believe, the research evidence is clear: rates of youthful drinking,
smoking, reckless driving, and criminal activity are all influenced to
some extent by rational considerations of cost and consequence.53
Prices, regulations, and legal sanctions can all influence the overall
rates of participation.
A direct indication that even criminally active people can be
persuaded to give up guns comes from systematic evaluations of
policy interventions. The best known one is probably Boston's
Operation Ceasefire, instituted by a consortium of law enforcement
agencies in 1996 in response to a very high rate of gun violence among
local gangs.54 Gang members were directly informed by the police
that the entire gang would be held accountable if any one member
was known to have misused a gun.55 An abrupt and sustained drop in
deadly gang violence followed.56 Figure 1 depicts the annual gun-
homicide counts from 1981 to 1999 for youths age fifteen to twenty-
52. FBI, supra note 7, at 23, 32, 38; Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the United States, 2002
Statistical Tables, National Crime Victimization Survey, at tbl. 66, available at
http://wAw.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus02.pdf.
53. See generally Philip J. Cook & Michael J. Moore, Environment and Persistence
in Youthful Drinking Patterns, in Risky Behavior Among Youths: An Economic
Analysis 375 (Jonathan Gruber ed., 2001) [hereinafter Risky Behavior Among
Youths] (discussing drinking); Thomas S. Dee & William N. Evans, Teens and Traffic
Safety, in Risky Behavior Among Youths, supra, at 121 (discussing reckless driving);
Jonathan Gruber & Jonathan Zinman, Youth Smoking in the United States: Evidence
and Implications, in Risky Behavior Among Youths, supra, at 69 (discussing
smoking); Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1156
(1998) (discussing criminal activity generally).
54. See generally Anthony A. Braga et al., Measuring the Impact of Operation
Ceasefire, in Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire
55 (2001).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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four, for Boston (Suffolk County), and for the rest of Massachusetts,
which can be considered a sort of control group.
5 1
FIGURE 1: GUN HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATIONS, AGE 15-24, BOSTON
AND THE REST OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM 1981 TO 199958
Gun Homicide Victims, Age 15-24
60-
50 -
40-
S30 -
20
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999
- Boston -- X Rest of Mass.
Operation Ceasefire is the most dramatic, but there are other
instances in which special police efforts to keep guns off the street
have been carefully evaluated and also found effective. 9 In particular,
evaluations of intensive police patrols directed against illicit carrying
in Pittsburgh (and perhaps Kansas City and Indianapolis as well) find
evidence suggestive of a deterrent effect.60 There have been mixed
57. See Jeffrey Fagan, Policing Guns and Youth Violence, 12 Future Child. 133,
137 (2002) (making a similar comparison, and concluding that the drop in youth
homicides was not confined to Boston, but rather shared across Massachusetts cities,
suggesting that the intervention in Boston may not deserve much credit). Note,
however, that the time series for the other towns in Massachusetts with populations of
25,000 to 50,000 drops the year before the intervention and then actually increases in
1996, the first year of the Boston intervention. Id. In any event, Anthony A. Braga
and his co-authors choose to use other large cities as a control, rather than the rest of
Massachusetts. See Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing, Deterrence,
and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. Res. Crime
& Delinquency 195,209-15 (2001).
58. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Mortality Detail and Multiple Cause of Death, Study No. 3874 (1981); and Multiple
Cause of Death, Study Nos. 9880 (1982), 9879 (1983), 9811 (1984), 9812 (1985), 9723
(1986), 9724 (1987), 6299 (1988), 6257 (1989), 6319 (1990), 6320 (1991), 6546 (1992),
6799 (1993), 2201 (1994), 2392 (1995), 2702 (1996), 3085 (1997), 3306 (1998), 3473
(1999) (unpublished data, on file with authors), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2004) (allowing visitors to search study by study).
59. See generally Fagan, supra note 57.
60. See generally Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in
Evaluating Gun Policy, supra note 2, at 217; Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Reducing
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results from evaluations of policies to increase sentences for illicit
carrying and other gun crime. Project Exile, a widely touted program
started in Richmond, Virginia, which seeks long sentences for felons
convicted of illicit gun possession, appears to have had negligible
effect on gun violence.61 But systematic evaluations have concluded
that a well-publicized law requiring a mandatory prison sentence for
illicit carrying in Massachusetts-the Bartley-Fox Amendment-had
some success in reducing gun use in assault.62
For many criminals, a gun is a desirable but not essential tool. Even
modest changes in the legal consequences of gun use, or in the cost or
difficulty of obtaining one, will make a difference to some.
A. Gun Prevalence and Criminal Use
While gun ownership is widespread in the United States as a whole,
there are large geographic differences in just how widespread. Figure
2 depicts the household prevalence for handgun ownership and
ownership of any type of weapon, by census division. Note that
handgun ownership tracks closely with any gun ownership across
divisions. The prevalence of any gun ownership is twice as high in the
deep South as in the northeast, with the other divisions in between.
State-level rates of gun ownership differ still more, ranging from
about thirteen percent (in Hawaii and Massachusetts) to over fifty-
five percent (in several states of the deep South).63
The challenge of keeping guns away from youths and criminals
increases with the general prevalence of gun ownership. Correlational
evidence demonstrates that youths and criminals are more likely to
carry and misuse guns in communities in which guns are prevalent.'
As a result, case-fatality rates are elevated in robberies and assaults in
gun-dense communities.65 The highest homicide rates tend to occur in
communities that combine a high rate of violence with a high rate of
gun ownership.66  A reasonable conclusion is that gun control
Firearms Violence Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 Criminology & Pub. Pol'y 119
(2001); Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun
Violence: 'Hot Spots' Patrol in Kansas City, 12 Just. Q. 673 (1995).
61. See generally Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements:
The Case of Project Exile, in Evaluating Gun Policy, supra note 2, at 251.
62. Act of July 30, 1974, ch. 649, 1974 Mass. Acts 645 (codified at Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 269 § 10 (Law. Co-op. 1992)). See generally Glenn L. Pierce & William J.
Bowers, The Bartley-Fox Gun Law's Short-Term Impact on Crime in Boston, 455
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 120 (1981).
63. Deborah Azrael et al., State and Local Prevalence of Firearms Ownership:
Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J. Quantitative Criminology 43, 58-60 (2004).
64. See generally Philip J. Cook, The Effect of Gun Availability on Robbery and
Robbery Murder: A Cross-Section Study of Fifty Cities, 3 Pol'y Stud. Rev. Ann. 743
(1979); Cook & Ludwig, supra note 32; Duggan, supra note 39.
65. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Litigation as Regulation: Firearms, in
Regulation Through Litigation 67, 78 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
66. Id. at 77-78.
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measures that reduced the prevalence of guns in a community would
reduce the prevalence of gun use in assault and hence the homicide
rate.67 However, the gun-control policies adopted by the federal and
state governments in the United States are not intended to reduce the
general rate of gun ownership, but rather to bar acquisition and
possession by those who are prohibited by reason of age or criminal
record.68
FIGURE 2: HOUSEHOLD PREVALENCE OF GUN AND HANDGUN
OWNERSHIP-CENSUS DIVISION AVERAGES FOR 1996-200069
Household Gun Prevalence by Census Division
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67. See Robert L. Ohsfeldt & Michael A. Morrisey, Firearms, Firearms Injury, and
Gun Control: A Critical Survey of the Literature, 13 Advances Health Econ. & Health
Services Res. 65, 69-70 (1992).
68. See generally Cook & Ludwig, supra note 65; Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms
and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,4 J. Legal Stud. 133 (1975).
69. This figure is based on data from a series of surveys. James A. Davis et al.,
General Social Surveys, 1972-2002, Study No. 3728 (unpublished data, on file with
authors), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2004) (allowing visitors
to search study by study). Census divisions contain the following states: East South
Central-Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; West North Central-Iowa,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; West South
Central-Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; South Atlantic-Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia,
West Virginia; East North Central-Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin;
New England-Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
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What is the mechanism that links gun prevalence to criminal gun
use? Guns are certainly versatile tools, and may be put to uses that
were never considered at the time they were acquired. In some cases
an assault is perpetrated by a family member with a gun that has been
in the home for many years. But in practice that scenario is relatively
rare, and the motivations for acquisition are closely linked to actual
use. In particular, guns used in crime tend to be acquired shortly
before the use.7' The "career" of a criminal tends to be quite short-
typically a handful of years.71 So stopping the transactions that arm
each new cohort would eliminate most criminal misuse in a few years'
time. Most transactions that move guns to high risk people and
criminal uses are directly from the diffuse inventory in private hands.
In particular, guns move from the licit to illicit circulation as the result
of theft from a home or vehicle, or private sale in what is known as the
secondary market,72 or short-term loans and rental arrangements.73
That is not the whole story; some of the guns used in crime are sold by
licensed dealers to criminals or their straw purchasers, as suggested by
the disproportionate number of crime guns that are less than a year
old and by the results of law enforcement investigations of "dirty"
dealers.74 But most crime guns come from diffuse sources.75
B. Gun Policy: A Pragmatic Approach
The evidence suggests that slogans are generally a poor guide to
designing effective policy. In sum, that evidence strongly suggests that
Vermont; and Middle Atlantic-New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania.
70. See Franklin E. Zimring, Street Crime and New Guns: Some Implications for
Firearms Control, 4 J. Crim. Just. 95, 104 (1976) (recognizing for the first time that
newer handguns contribute disproportionately to the crimes that result in gun
confiscation); see also Philip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms
Tracing: Strategic and Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 Ariz.
L. Rev. 277, 295 (2001) (reporting that of the violent-crime-involved guns submitted
for tracing by law enforcement agencies in 1999, about fifteen percent had been first
sold at retail within one year, and about one-third within three years). Since most
crime guns are not purchased at retail by the criminal, we know that the elapsed time
from the last transaction (purchase, theft, loan) must be less than the time since the
first retail sale. See id. at 296. Unfortunately, there is not much direct evidence on
that matter, but some interview data suggests that there is often a close temporal
connection. See Cook et al., supra note 51, at 64-65.
71. See 1 Panel on Research on Criminal Careers, Nat'l Research Council,
Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals" 94 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986)
("Research on the length of criminal careers indicates, first, that careers are
reasonably short, averaging about 5 years for offenders who are active in index
offenses as young adults."). Note, however, that "this average hides major differences
across offenders." 1 Id. at 5.
72. Cook et al., supra note 51, at 68.
73. See Sheley & Wright, supra note 51, at 46-50.
74. Wintemute, supra note 35, at 60-62.
75. See Anthony A. Braga et al., The Illegal Supply of Firearms, in 29 Crime and
Justice: A Review of Research 319, 337-40 (Michael Tonry ed., 2002) [hereinafter 29
Crime and Justice]; Cook & Braga, supra note 70, at 291-94.
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gun use intensifies violence and has considerable cost to the
community; that widespread gun ownership has little deterrent effect
on the residential burglary or other types of crime, although it does
provide a means of self-defense and peace of mind to some; and that
the extent to which youths and criminals carry and misuse guns
depends not just on their weapon-related preferences, but also on gun
prevalence and the legal consequences of gun misuse.
We organize the discussion of policy alternatives around two large
topics, which are essentially "demand" and "supply" or, alternatively,
''availability" and "use." The "demand" topic includes policies
intended to make guns a legal liability to criminals, in the sense of
increasing the likelihood or severity of punishment for those who
choose to use guns in their criminal activity. The "supply-availability"
topic includes policies intended to reduce the availability of guns to
those who are proscribed from possessing them. We do not have
much to say here about the possibilities for removing access to guns
by suicidal people, although it is an important topic in its own right.76
1. Increasing the Legal Liability to Those Who Misuse Guns
If criminals know that carrying a gun or using a gun in crime will
increase the likelihood or severity of legal consequences, then some
will substitute other weapons or modify their behavior to reduce the
need for a weapon.77 What is required is that guns receive priority in
law enforcement, prosecution, and sentencing. The legal authority for
giving priority to reducing gun violence over violence with less lethal
weapons is generally available. Operation Ceasefire demonstrated
that such an effort can be usefully tailored to the violence problems
that are causing the greatest concern in a jurisdiction.78 That success
helped spawn the federal program known as Project Safe
Neighborhoods, in which local jurisdictions are encouraged to develop
gun-enforcement programs in conjunction with U.S. attorneys.79
Further, most states create the possibility of a gun-emphasis policy in
76. See generally David A. Brent, Firearms and Suicide, 932 Annals N.Y. Acad.
Sci. 225 (2001); Mark Duggan, Guns and Suicide, in Evaluating Gun Policy, supra
note 2, at 41; Matthew Miller & David Hemenway, Firearm Prevalence and the Risk
of Suicide: A Review, 2 Harv. Health Pol'y Rev. 29 (2001); Matthew Miller & David
Hemenway, The Relationship Between Firearms and Suicide: A Review of the
Literature, 4 Aggression & Violent Behav. 59 (1999).
77. See generally Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, "Perversity, Futility,
Jeopardy": An Economic Analysis of the Attack on Gun Control, 59 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 91 (1996).
78. See generally George Tita et al., Reducing Gun Violence: Results from an
Intervention in East Los Angeles (2003); David M. Kennedy et al., Youth Violence in
Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders and a Use-Reduction Strategy, 59 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 147 (1996).
79. See Project Safe Neighborhoods, America's Network Against Gun Violence,
at http://www.psn.gov (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
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the courts by specifying sentencing enhancements for use of a gun in
criminal assaults and other crimes." In particular, a recent study
suggests that domestic violence has become less deadly as a result of
state and federal laws that provide criminal penalties for gun
possession and use by domestic batterers.81
Some gun-emphasis programs in law enforcement are more cost-
effective than others. Project Exile is an example of a program that
despite the favorable publicity given the initial implementation in
Richmond, has not been effective in reducing gun violence.82 Its
commendable goal of combating a wave of gun violence in the early
1990s was to be achieved by the threat of severe sentences for one
group: those banned from gun possession due to their criminal
record. One explanation for the apparent ineffectiveness of this
program is its focus on increasing the severity of punishment rather
than the likelihood. Deterrence research suggests that crime is
generally more responsive to changes in the perceived likelihood of
punishment, than to changes in the severity.83
In line with the goal of increasing the likelihood of punishment for
gun crime are programs intended to help police identify a suspect in a
criminal shooting, or generate evidence against a suspect in a
shooting. It is now routine in many jurisdictions for law enforcement
agencies to trace confiscated guns through the data system that is
managed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives ("ATF").84 A successful trace links the gun to the first
retail purchaser. Most traces begin with the serial number and model
of the gun, which is checked against the records of the manufacturer
or importer, then the distributor, and then the licensed dealer who
sold it at retail. There are several loose links in this chain, and only
about half of trace attempts are successful. 5 It is also true that most
crime guns are transferred one or more times following the first retail
sale, and those transfers are usually not recorded in any official
record.86
The tracing system could be improved in a variety of ways.
California, for example, requires that all handgun transfers be
registered with a state agency, which creates the possibility of
following a handgun along the chain of transfers following the first
80. See generally Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 18.
81. Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 19, at 183-88.
82. See generally Raphael & Ludwig, supra note 61.
83. See Philip J. Cook, Reducing Injury and Death Rates in Robbery, Policy
Analysis, Winter 1980, at 21, 26-28; Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at
the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, in 23 Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research 1, 33-36 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
84. Cook & Braga, supra note 70, at 277.
85. Id. at 290.
86. See Julius Wachtel, Sources of Crime Guns in Los Angeles, California, 21
Policing: Int'l J. Police Strategies & Mgmt. 220, 221-24 (1998).
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retail sale.87 While that system has not been adopted in other states
due to opposition by those who assert that government cannot be
trusted with registration records, there are more limited changes that
would still be useful-for example, a requirement that licensed
dealers report the model and serial number (but not the buyer) for
each gun that they sell, so that the tracing process could bypass the
distribution chain and identify the right dealer directly, including for
guns sold secondhand by dealers.
ATF also compiles a database with ballistic information on crime-
scene bullets, shell casings, and recovered guns.88 This database
creates the possibility of documenting (or discovering) that two or
more shootings involved the same gun. Maryland and New York have
taken this idea one step further, requiring that new handguns sold in
those states be test fired, and the ballistics information recorded.89
Whether this requirement will prove useful remains to be seen.
In general the "demand side" approach is promising because for
many criminals the choice of whether to carry and use a gun depends
in part on the consequences. Law enforcement should seek to tip the
balance by making the legal consequences more severe and salient.
2. Reducing Gun Availability
The evidence that availability matters comes from the analysis of
how weapon choice in crime is influenced by the prevalence of gun
ownership in a county or state; as noted above, the likelihood that a
robber or assailant will use a gun, or that a teenager will carry one, is
closely related to availability in that sense. On the other hand there is
little evidence that regulations on gun commerce have been effective
at reducing interpersonal gun violence.9"
The Federal Gun Control Act stipulates that only licensed dealers
are authorized to receive interstate shipments of guns, and that these
87. Violence Prevention Research Program, Handgun Commerce in California,
1999, at 1 (2002), available at http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/vprp/Hgcomm99.pdf.
88. See generally Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, National
Integrated Ballistic Information Network, ATF's NIBIN Program (May 2003), at
http://www.atf.gov/nibin/nibin.pdf.
89. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. Ctr. for Gun Policy & Research, Fact Sheet,
The Maryland "Responsible Gun Safety Act of 2000," at
http://www.jhsph.edu/gunpolicy/MDlaw-summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2004)
(discussing the Maryland statute).
90. See generally Kleck, supra note 4; Lott, supra note 38; Gary Kleck & E. Britt
Patterson, The Impact of Gun Control and Gun Ownership Levels on Violence Rates,
9 J. Quantitative Criminology 249 (1993). A caution: the lack of definitive results
reflects in part the technical problems of conducting evaluations of this sort. The
challenge is to sort out the effect of a typically modest policy change from all the
other factors influencing crime rates. Relatively small reductions in homicide rates
may well be lost in the statistical "noise," and there has been extensive debate in the
technical literature on how best to control for other systematic sources of variation.
See Hemenway, supra note 4, at app. A.
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dealers must initiate background checks on buyers to determine
whether they are eligible to purchase.9" The background check for
handgun sales was imposed nationwide in 1994 together with a
mandatory waiting period as part of the law named in honor of James
Brady, President Reagan's press secretary who was shot during the
assassination attempt against Reagan in 1982. In 1998, the legal
requirement was expanded to include sales of rifles and shotguns, at
the same time that an "instant" background check provision replaced
the waiting period.9 2 Since 1994, hundreds of thousands of would-be
buyers have been denied as a result of the discovery of a criminal
record or other disqualifying condition during the background check.93
But our evaluation found that the law had no measurable effect on
gun homicide rates or overall homicide rates. That evaluation
contrasted homicide trends in thirty-two states that instituted a
background check as a result of the federal law in 1994 (the
"treatment" states), with the eighteen "control" states that already
had such a requirement in place.
91. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.). See also Vernick & Hepburn, supra
note 18, at 350-52; Zimring, supra note 68, at 148-57.
92. James B. Jacobs, Can Gun Control Work? 97-98 (2002).
93. Michael Bowling et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Background Checks for Firearm Transfers, 2002, at 2 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/bcft02.pdf.
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FIGURE 3: TRENDS IN HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION RATES FOR AGE
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It should be noted that the Brady Law has had a large effect on
interstate-trafficking patterns, and in particular has reduced the flow
of guns from lax-control states to more tightly regulated states.95 It is
certainly plausible, then, that this law reduced gun availability in
places like Chicago and Boston. But evidence from gun use in
homicide provides no support for this conjecture. 96
94. Philip J. Cook, Evidence-Based Gun Policy, Address Before the Eighth HELP
Network Conference 10 (Apr. 18, 2004), at
http://www.helpnetwork.org/pdf/2004%2OConference/Phil%2OCook.pdf. The data
presented at the HELP Network Conference was based on calculations using
mortality data files from 1985 to 2000 obtained through the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention & Control,
WISQARS Fatal Injuries: Mortality Reports, at
http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate.html (last reviewed Mar. 4, 2004). For
an earlier and slightly different interpretation of the same data, see Jens Ludwig &
Philip J. Cook, Homicide & Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 588 (2000).
95. See Cook & Braga, supra note 70, at 303-07; D.W. Webster et al., Relationship
Between Licensing, Registration, and Other Gun Sales Laws and the Source State of
Crime Guns, 7 Inj. Prevention 184, 186-88 (2001).
96. See generally Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The Effects of the Brady Act on
Gun Violence, in Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America 283 (Bernard E. Harcourt
ed., 2003). This finding also has implications for what may be learned from gun policy
evaluations that focus on interstate transfer of firearms as the outcome of interest. See
generally Webster et al., supra note 95; Douglas S. Weil & Rebecca C. Knox, Effects
of Limiting Handgun Purchases on Interstate Transfer of Firearms, 275 JAMA 1759
(1996). After all, even dramatic changes in this measure need not translate into
changes in the rate of gun crime.
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Some states and localities have extended federal regulations:
Illinois requires that gun owners have a state-issued identification
card;97 several states restrict sales of handguns to one per month per
individual buyer; other states impose a waiting period or require some
version of registration on handgun sales.9" Chicago (in 1982) and
Washington, D.C. (in 1976) have banned residents from acquiring
handguns and restricted the operation of gun dealers within city
limits. 99 The effects of the Washington ban have been evaluated
several times; the data do suggest a reduction in gun use in criminal
violence in the early years following the ban."°° But the huge spike in
youth homicide that occurred in the city during the late 1980s, when
Washington became the "murder capital," undercuts the case for
effectiveness.1°' The Chicago ban in 1982 has not been evaluated
systematically, although the homicide victimization rate for black
males ages ten to twenty-four in Cook County, Illinois rose sharply
between 1984 and 1998.12 To determine whether gun availability
declined in response to the Chicago ban, we analyzed the best
available proxy for the prevalence of gun ownership, the percentage
of suicides with guns. Figure 4 depicts the time series before and after
the ban, both for Cook County (which includes Chicago) and the rest
of Illinois (as a sort of control group). There is some decline in this
percentage in Chicago during the first three years, but then a long
upward trend that is not matched by the rest of the state. It appears
97. See Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 18, at 378 (stating that in Illinois, there is
a maximum thirty-day waiting period in order to receive a Firearm Owner
Identification Card (Permit)).
98. Id. at 353-57.
99. See Chi., Ill. Municipal Code § 8-20-050, -170 (LEXIS through Council Journal
2004); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-2502.01-.02, (LEXIS through 2004 Act 15-441).
100. The ban on handgun acquisition in Washington, D.C. was imposed in 1976,
and was associated with an initial reduction in gun crime and homicide. See generally
Edward D. Jones III, The District of Columbia's "Firearm Control Regulations Act of
1975": The Toughest Handgun Control Law in the United States-Or Is It?, 455
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 138 (1981); Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive
Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 New
Eng. J. Med. 1615 (1991). The latter evaluation was challenged on the grounds that
the control group-the D.C. suburbs-was not adequate. See generally Chester L.
Britt et al., A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some Cautionary Notes on the Use
of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment, 30 Law & Soc'y Rev.
361 (1996). But see David McDowall et al., Using Quasi-Experiments to Evaluate
Firearm Laws: Comment on Britt et al.'s Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law, 30 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 381 (1996) (comparing gun homicide and suicide trends in Washington
with what was observed in other nearby cities). Of particular interest is Baltimore,
which experienced a reduction in gun homicides around the time of the D.C. ban, but
no decline in gun suicides. Id. at 384-85.
101. The black male homicide victimization rate for ages ten through twenty-four
in the District of Columbia climbed from 65.3 per 100,000 people in the mid 1980s to
512 per 100,000 people in the early 1990s. See Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, After
the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth Violence in the United States, in 29 Crime and
Justice, supra note 75, at 1, 19.
102. Id.
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reasonable to conclude that any effect of the ban on gun prevalence
was temporary.
That such regulations have not had measurable effects on gun
availability to criminals may be a reflection of the ease with which
these regulations are circumvented by the informal, secondary
market, or the limits of available statistical techniques to detect
modest policy impacts. Because many local gun control measures
appear to be undermined in part by across-state gun trafficking, there
is some chance that similar laws enacted at the federal rather than
state level could be more effective. But currently there is no direct
evidence to support this conjecture. 3
FIGURE 4: TREND IN PERCENT SUICIDE WITH GUN IN CHICAGO AND
THE REST OF ILLINOIS'0
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103. See Jacobs, supra note 92, at 125-36 (offering a skeptical perspective on the
possibilities of keeping guns from criminals).
104. Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Mortality Detail and Multiple Cause of Death, Study No. 3874 (1981); Multiple Cause
of Death, Study Nos. 3905 (1968-1973), 3906 (1974-1978), 3895 (1979), 3897 (1980),
9880 (1982), 9879 (1983), 9811 (1984), 9812 (1985), 9723 (1986), 9724 (1987), 6299
(1988), 6257 (1989), 6319 (1990), 6320 (1991), 6546 (1992), 6799 (1993), 2201 (1994),
2392 (1995), 2702 (1996), 3085 (1997), 3306 (1998), 3473 (1999) (unpublished data, on
file with authors), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2004) (allowing
visitors to search study by study). Note that the Chicago data is for Cook County in
its entirety.
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Most of the transfers that supply criminals with their guns are off-
the-books sales or loans in which the immediate source is someone
other than a licensed dealer. One segment of this secondary market
consists of one-time deals between friends, neighbors, or family
members, but there are also more organized segments of the market.
One important structure in this market is the gun show, where would-
be buyers and sellers come together in a large "flea market" where
the main item of exchange is guns.105 There are also some individuals
and illicit organizations that traffic in guns over an extended period,
or that serve to broker deals that bring buyers and sellers together.
1 6
In some cases the guns are new, having been acquired from a licensed
dealer through a straw purchase or even off-the-books sale by the
dealer. 107
Over thirty lawsuits have been brought against the firearms industry
by cities and other plaintiffs, asserting among other things that the
manufacturers and dealers have been negligent or worse in theirbusiness practices.18 One goal of these suits has been to force the
industry to take greater responsibility to ensure that retailers follow
the rules and take steps to ensure that their customers are legitimate.
These lawsuits have identified and documented a good deal of
irresponsible and even criminal behavior on the part of licensed
dealers, and it would surely be a step in the right direction if they were
compelled to follow the rules or shut down.19 Still, direct evidence on
how much could be accomplished by this approach is not available.
Because most of the transfers that arm criminals occur in the
secondary market, it is of particular interest to analyze possibilities for
effective intervention. There are a variety of possibilities, from
requiring that all transfers be channeled through licensed dealers and
duly recorded (a requirement that could be strengthened if the
transferor were otherwise to be held liable for any injuries caused by
the gun), to increased efforts to police gun shows and shut down gun
traffickers, to adoption of a federal rule that dealers could not make
multiple handgun sales to the same individual.110 Another promising
"pressure point" for reducing gun availability is theft, which accounts
105. See generally Violence Policy Ctr., More Gun Dealers Than Gas Stations: A
Study of Federally Licensed Firearms Dealers in America (1992); Wintemute, supra
note 35.
106. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
108. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 65, at 92-93; Stephen P. Teret & Patti L.
Culross, Product-Oriented Approaches to Reducing Youth Gun Violence, 12 Future
Child. 119, 129 (2002).
109. Wintemute, supra note 35, at 61.
110. Virginia, Maryland, and California now limit handgun sales by dealers to one
per customer per month. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 18, at 356. The first such
regulation was adopted in Virginia, which had been a major source for gun trafficking
to the Northeast. Consequently, this flow was greatly reduced. Weil & Knox, supra
note 96, at 1760.
[Vol. 73
2004] PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE GUN POLICY 611
for a flow of over a half million guns into the secondary market each
year;.1' theft could be reduced if owners could be induced to lock their
guns.
Guns are not subject to federal consumer product safety regulation,
so existing restrictions on gun design have been imposed by specific
legislation."2 The 1934 National Firearms Act greatly restricted the
private ownership of automatic weapons, sawed-off-shotguns, hand
grenades, and other weapons associated with gangland violence.'13
This law certainly makes sense on the face of it, and appears to have
been quite effective. In 1994, Congress adopted a modest extension
(the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act) that banned
production and transfer of certain semiautomatic "assault" weapons-
but did not restrict the circulation of the current stock of such guns, or
forbid the manufacture of very similar weapons that meet the
technical requirements of the law."4 That law was sunsetted in 2004,
and it was not renewed by Congress. A ban on certain small cheap
handguns ("Saturday Night Specials") in Maryland appears to have
reduced handgun homicide in that state, without affecting other types
of homicide."5
More intriguing is the effort, partially funded by the federal
government, to develop "smart" guns that would only be usable by
the rightful owner." 6 Unfortunately that effort has been guided by
the very narrow goal of protecting law enforcement officers from
being shot by their own weapon. Various designs are under
consideration. For example, it might be possible to equip a gun with a
safety mechanism that prevented the gun from firing unless it
111. See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 1, at 30; Kleck, supra note 4, at 90-94.
112. Teret & Culross, supra note 108, at 128. A recent study analyzed
unintentional firearms deaths to determine what proportion was preventable by three
safety devices: personalization devices, loaded chamber indicators, and magazine
safeties. See generally J.S. Vernick et al., Unintentional and Undetermined Firearm
Related Deaths: A Preventable Death Analysis for Three Safety Devices, 9 Inj.
Prevention 307 (2003). The conclusion is that incorporating such devices into firearm
design had the potential of saving hundreds of lives each year. Id.
113. See National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934); Vernick & Hepburn,
supra note 18, at 350; Zimring, supra note 68, at 138, 149.
114. Vernick & Hepburn, supra note 18, at 351-52. See generally Public Safety and
Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-22, 108 Stat. 1996 (1994)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 note); Jeffrey A. Roth et al., Impact Evaluation of the
Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act of 1994 (1997).
115. See generally Daniel W. Webster et al., Effects of Maryland's Law Banning
"Saturday Night Special" Handguns on Homicides, 155 Am. J. Epidemiology 406
(2002).
116. See Owner-Authorized Handguns: A Workshop Summary 14-17 (Lance A.
Davis & Greg Pearson eds., 2003) [hereinafter Owner-Authorized Handguns]. See
generally Philip J. Cook & James A. Leitzel, "Smart" Guns: A Technological Fix for
Regulating the Secondary Market, 20 Contemp. Econ. Pol'y 38 (2002); Teret &
Culross, supra note 108; Stephen P. Teret & Daniel W. Webster, Reducing Gun
Deaths in the United States: Personalized Guns Would Help-And Would Be
Achievable, 318 Brit. Med. J. 1160 (1999).
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"recognized" the palm print of the person holding the gun, though any
such high-tech biometric approach raises questions of reliability and
cost.' 7 In any event, a different, more ambitious goal should be
considered. Design changes that made it convenient for the owner to
lock his gun (while keeping the gun readily available for self-defense)
could be helpful in reducing the large flow of stolen guns, thereby
reducing one important source of guns to youths and criminals.118
Locking guns could also prevent children from unauthorized use of a
gun in the household. 9 While trigger locks are widely distributed and
would be sufficient for this purpose if they were actually used, an
internal keyed lock is more convenient and hence likely to be more
widely used by owners. Several manufacturers already sell models
with internal locks,' and Maryland now requires that all new
handguns be equipped with integrated mechanical locking devices.'21
It seems plausible that a requirement that new handguns be
equipped with an internal locking mechanism operated by a separate
key would pass a cost-benefit test. Its effectiveness in reducing
unauthorized transfers would increase over time as an ever higher
percentage of the guns in circulation were sold after the requirement
went into effect. If practical "smart" technology is some day
available, then that would be still better, depending on the details of
its design.
CONCLUSION
The problems of gun violence are large, pervasive, and multi-
faceted. (Indeed, our discussion has virtually ignored one major facet
of the gun problem, suicide-not because we deem it unimportant,
but because to some extent it is a distinct topic, both with respect to
the evidence and the array of promising policies.) Even interventions
that reduce deaths by a percentage point or two may well be
worthwhile, since that amounts to hundreds of deaths per year. The
criminal justice system has front-line responsibility, but police and
prosecutors do not always place appropriately high priority on
separating guns from violence. Other agencies and organizations are
also in a position to make a difference. Most obviously, the firearms
industry could take greater responsibility for designing and marketing
guns in ways that would reduce the costs engendered by the misuse of
its product. Mental health agencies should ensure that the standard
117. Owner-Authorized Handguns, supra note 116, at 15-16.
11& See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
119. See Hemenway, supra note 4, at 135. See generally Trudy Ann Karlson &
Stephen W. Hargarten, Reducing Firearm Injury and Death: A Public Health
Sourcebook on Guns (1997); Stephen P. Teret & Garen J. Wintemute, Policies to
Prevent Firearm Injuries, Health Aff., Winter 1993, at 96.
120. Karlson & Hargarten, supra note 119, at 132.
121. Teret & Culross, supra note 108, at 128.
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protocol for responding to the needs of a suicidal person should
always include attention to his or her access to lethal weapons.
122
The way forward in the effort against gun violence is partly a matter
of common sense, coupled with an experimental frame of mind. The
evidence demonstrates that it is not a quixotic or futile endeavor, and
the goal of separating guns from violence is worthy of a considerable
investment.
122. Cook & Ludwig, supra note 2, at 13-14 (discussing Mark Duggan's findings
that gun availability directly impacts the suicide rate). See generally Duggan, supra
note 76.
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